Layer Seven Security

Q&A: Cybersecurity Monitoring with SAP Solution Manager

Layer Seven on July 30, 2017

How does Solution Manager detect threats and vulnerabilities in SAP systems? What specific applications in SolMan are used for vulnerability, patch and threat management? What are the requirements for using these areas? How long does it take to configure? What are the differences between monitoring using SolMan 7.1 and 7.2? What are the benefits of using SolMan versus third party tools? Why should you partner with Layer Seven Security to help you leverage the cybersecurity capabilities of SAP Solution Manager?

Discover the answers to these and many other questions in the new Q&A section and learn how you can immediately protect your SAP systems from advanced threats using tools you already own and an approach recommended by SAP.

Remember to bookmark the page since we will be updating the questions and answers periodically. Also, feel free to submit your questions for our experts in the comments below.

Q: What is SAP Solution Manager?
A: Solution Manager is the most widely deployed SAP product after ECC. It’s installed in almost all SAP landscapes and is used for application lifecycle activities such as system patching and upgrades, change management, incident management, and system monitoring.

Q: How is Solution Manager licensed?
A: Usage rights for Solution Manager are bundled with SAP support and maintenance agreements. SAP Enterprise Support customers can manage their whole IT infrastructure with Solution Manager. Customers with Standard Support can manage SAP products within their IT landscapes with Solution Manager. Licensing for SAP HANA is included with the usage rights for SAP Solution Manager 7.2.

Q: What security tools are available in Solution Manager?
A: There are several applications in Solution Manger that should be used for advanced security monitoring. We recommend Service Level Reporting, Security Dashboards, System Recommendations, Interface Monitoring and Security Alerting.

Q: Why doesn’t Layer Seven Security recommend the EWA and SOS reports?
E: There are drawbacks with both reports. The EarlyWatch Alert (EWA) performs some security checks but is not specifically a security report. Therefore, the range and volume of checks performed by EWA for security is low. The Security Optimization Service (SOS) provides better coverage but is not fully automated. You must submit a service request to run SOS for ABAP systems. Service requests to run SOS for Java systems must be submitted to SAP.

Q: What are Service Level Reports?
A: Service Level Reports (SLR) automate vulnerability reporting for SAP systems. They perform scheduled checks for hundreds of security weaknesses for ABAP, HANA and Java systems and automatically distribute the results via email, SFTP or the Enterprise Portal. SLRs include detailed descriptions for findings, risk ratings, links to relevant SAP Notes and guidance at the SAP Help Portal and compliance scorecards for frameworks such as NIST, PCI DSS and IT-SOX.

Q: How do SLRs work?
A: SLRs read the results of automated daily vulnerability scans performed by Solution Manager for SAP systems. The results are checked against security KPIs during runtime. SLRs are typically scheduled to run on a weekly or monthly schedule.

Q: Are SLRs available in multiple languages?
A: Yes, SLRs can be run in any language including French, German, Spanish, Arabic, Japanese, and Mandarin.

Q: Are SLRs customizable?
A: Yes, you can customize every aspect of service level reports including the design, layout, security checks, and KPI metrics and thresholds.

Q: Can you provide a sample Service Level Report?
A: Yes, submit your request here.

Q: What is System Recommendations?
A: System Recommendations is an application in Solution Manger that performs automated patch management for SAP systems. It connects directly to SAP Support to download required security notes and monitor the status of notes implemented in systems through regular background jobs.

Q: Does System Recommendations also download and apply corrections?
A: Yes, System Recommendations downloads corrections from SAP Support to target systems. The user is automatically directed to SNOTE in the target systems once the corrections are downloaded.

Q: Does System Recommendations identify the impact of security patches?
A: Yes, System Recommendations integrates with applications in Solution Manager to perform change impact analysis and discover programs, function modules, transactions, reports and business processes effected by notes.

Q: Does System Recommendations integrate with Change Request Management (ChaRM)?
A: Yes, System Recommendations includes the option to automatically generate a change request for required notes.

Q: What are Security Dashboards?
A: Security Dashboards monitor critical key performance indicators to track vulnerabilities and threats across SAP landscapes in real-time.

Q: What type of metrics are monitored by Security Dashboards?
A: The Dashboards connect to data stores in Solution Manager for event-driven alerts and system and user level vulnerabilities. Users can drilldown from aggregated results to detailed values.

Q: What type of data visualizations are available in the Security Dashboards?
Users can select from column, line, pie, scatter and other charts and Fiori tiles and tables.

Q: What is Interface Monitoring?
A: Interface Monitoring is used to map and track system interfaces in SAP landscapes including RFC, HTTP, IDoc and Web Service connections. It automatically creates a topology of system interfaces and monitors the usage of the interfaces in real-time. Alerts can be generated for channel metrics including availability, configuration and performance.

Q: What is Security Alerting?
A: Security Alerting is based on the Monitoring and Alerting Infrastructure (MAI) of Solution Manager. MAI connects to data providers including event logs to monitor for security vulnerabilities and incidents. MAI generates automatic notifications for security incidents including emails and text messages.

Q: What type of security vulnerabilities and events are monitored by MAI?
A: MAI monitors system-level vulnerabilities such as the enabling of the invoker servlet in Java systems, insecure entries in access control lists for gateway servers, vulnerable RFC destinations, missing security notes, and many other areas. It also monitors KPIs for user-level security including users with dangerous profiles such as SAP_ALL and unlocked standard users.

Q: Can you perform threat detection using MAI in Solution Manager?
A: Yes, MAI includes file and database connectors for real-time monitoring of event data captured in SAP logs. This includes the security audit log, HANA log, UME log, HTTP log, gateway server log, and the Read Access Log.

Q: Can you integrate MAI alerts with Security Information Event Management (SIEM) and incident management systems?
A: Yes, MAI alerts can be automatically forwarded to SIEM systems such as Splunk, ArcSight, and QRadar for event correlation and forensic analysis. Alerts can also be forwarded to incident management systems such as BMC Remedy and ServiceNow.

Q: Does Solution Manager provide best practices for alert handling?
A: Yes, the Guided Procedure (GP) Framework in Solution Manager provides best practices and standard operating procedures for investigating and resolving security alerts. This standardizes and improves incident management procedures and reduces response times. The guided procedures include automated steps to further improve incident handling.

Q: What are the main differences between SAP Enterprise Threat Detection (ETD) and threat detection using SAP Solution Manager?
A: SAP ETD provides more advanced capabilities for event correlation and forensic analysis. However, Solution Manager can forward event data to SIEM systems that can correlate and analyze data on a wider scale than ETD by combining data from SAP and non-SAP sources. Also, ETD does not monitor for system-level vulnerabilities or provide guided procedures for alert handling.

Q: What are the requirements for using the security applications in Solution Manager?
A: The security applications are available in any SP level of Solution Manager versions 7.1 and 7.2. The only requirements are the completion of the SOLMAN_SETUP procedures for the relevant version.

Q: What are the differences between Solution Manager 7.1 ad 7.2 for security monitoring?
A: The main difference is the user-experience. Solution Manager 7.2 provides the improved Fiori interface including a launchpad for direct access to applications. Some functions such as automatic download of SAP corrections in System Recommendations are only available in Solution Manager 7.2. Also, the dashboarding and interface monitoring capabilities are more advanced in the latest version of Solution Manager.

Q: How many environments and systems can you monitor with Solution Manager?
A: There are no limits on the number of environments or systems that can be monitored by Solution Manager. However, Solution Manager must be appropriately sized to monitor large landscapes.

Q: How long does it take to configure the security applications?
A: Typical implementation timeframes are between 2-4 weeks for mid-sized landscapes.

Q: If security applications are available in standard installations of Solution Manager, why do we need to work with SAP Partners such as Layer Seven Security to configure these components?
A: Solution Manager provides the framework and the tools to perform advanced security monitoring. However, the standard installation of Solution Manager does not provide sufficient content for security monitoring. The content is developed, maintained and supported by Layer Seven Security. This includes patent-pending custom security policies, BW infoproviders, service level reports, monitoring objects and guided procedures. The content is licensed by SAP customers from Layer Seven Security and imported or transported into Solution Manager.

Q: What are the benefits of using Solution Manager for security monitoring versus third party tools ?

A: There are many advantages for using Solution Manager over third party tools. The most significant is lower cost: licensing and importing content for Solution Manager is less expensive than licensing entire platforms and solutions for SAP security monitoring. Solution Manager is also more flexible and customizable. It’s also recommended by SAP and supported and maintained directly by SAP. For further information, download the comparison chart.

Q: Does Layer Seven Security provide online demos for security monitoring using Solution Manager?
A: Yes, you can request a demo here.

Q: Does Layer Seven Security provide free readiness checks and trials for security monitoring using Solution Manager?
A: Yes, we offer free readiness checks to discover and remove any configuration gaps in Solution Manager to support security monitoring. We also provide free trials for Layer Seven’s custom security content. The trials can be performed remotely or on-site for up to 5 systems.

Q: Who shall I contact for further information?
A: Please call Layer Seven Security at 1-647-964-7370 or email info@layersevensecurity.com

Explore Service Level Reporting in SolMan 7.2

Layer Seven on February 27, 2017

Service Level Reporting (SLR) in SAP Solution Manager performs regular checks against key performance indicators using information available from the EarlyWatch Alert (EWA), Business Warehouse (BW) and the Computer Center Management System (CCMS). The checks can be for single systems or systems grouped into solutions. Reports run automatically on a weekly or monthly schedule but can also be triggered manually for on-demand reporting. SLRs can be displayed in HTML or Microsoft Word. SAP Solution Manger automatically distributes SLRs by email to recipients maintained in distribution lists.

Security-related metrics stored in internal or external BW systems can be read by SLR to create dynamic, detailed and user friendly vulnerability reports. This includes areas such as settings for profile parameters, access control lists in gateway security files, trusted RFC connections or destinations with stored logon credentials, unlocked standard users and standard users with default passwords, active ICF services, filter settings in the security audit log, missing security notes, and users with critical authorizations, profiles or transactions. For HANA systems, it includes database parameters, audit policies, the SYSTEM user, and users with critical SQL privileges. For Java systems, it includes properties for the UME and the invoker servlet. Furthermore, since event data from monitored systems is stored in BW and CCMS, SLR can also report on metrics for events in audit logs including the security audit log and syslog. The latter is particularly relevant for HANA systems which can write logs to operating system files.

SLRs are created and customized in the area for SAP Engagement and Service Delivery in the Fiori Launchpad.

Variants need to be maintained for each report including relevant systems, solutions, data sources, metrics, thresholds and schedule (weekly or monthly).

Once activated, the reports are executed by a regular automated job and accessed through the tile for Service Level Reports.

Comments can be included in SLRs before the reports are automatically distributed by email. SLRs include details of each vulnerability check, risk ratings, and links to relevant SAP Notes and documentation at the SAP Help Portal. Reports also include a gap assessment against compliance frameworks such NIST, PCI-DSS and IT-SOX. SLRs are archived by Solution Manager for trend analysis.

How to Secure SAP Systems from Password Attacks

Layer Seven on November 4, 2014

Exploiting weak password hashes is one of the most common and successful attack scenarios used against SAP systems. The availability of open-source programs such as Hashcat and John the Ripper enables even novice hackers to perform attacks against SAP passwords. In fact, Hashcat is capable of breaking any SAP password encoded using the BCODE hash algorithm in a maximum of 20 hours, regardless of the length and complexity of the password.

SAP systems support a variety of cryptographic algorithms to convert passwords into hash values. These values are stored in table URS02. This is designed to prevent the storage of passwords in clear-text. During the logon procedure, passwords entered by users are converted to a hash value and compared to the value stored for the user in table USR02. The logon is successful if there is match between the two values.

Since hash algorithms are one-way, it is not possible to calculate passwords from hash values. However, it is possible to compare values generated by tools such as Hashcat to the values stored in SAP tables to break passwords providing both are encoded using the identical algorithm.

Therefore, it is critical to restrict the ability to read and extract password hash values in table USR02. This can be achieved by controlling direct access to database tables through SQL statements using firewall rules. The ability to read tables using generic table browsing tools accessible through transactions SE16, SE17 and SE11 should also be restricted and monitored.

Note that USR02 is not the only table containing password hash values. In some releases, hashes can also be found in tables USH02, USH02_ARC_TMP, VUSER001 and VUSR02_PWD. Such tables should be assigned to the authorization group SPWD (refer to Note 1484692). Access to table USRPWDHISTORY should also be restricted since attackers are often able to guess current passwords based on former passwords if users employ variations of the same password.

There should be similar restrictions on debugging and transport authorizations since these can also be used to access or export SAP tables containing password hashes.

Users with access to multiple systems or systems in different environments should be required to use different passwords for each system and environment. Passwords for productive systems should not be identical to those used to access development or test systems.

SAP password code versions A-E are based on the MD5 hashing algorithm. The hash values generated through this mechanism are stored in the table column BCODE. All MD5 hashes are susceptible to brute force and other password attacks. Code versions F and G use the SHA1 algorithm. SHA1 hashes are stored in the PASSCODE column. They are less vulnerable than MD5 hashes but can be broken if passwords are short and relatively non-complex. The most secure hashing algorithm supported by SAP systems is iterated salted SHA-1 in code version H. This mechanism uses random salts and a higher number of iterations to mitigate password attacks. Iterated salted SHA-1 hash values are stored in PWDSALTEDHASH.

SAP kernels should be upgraded to 7.02 or higher to support PWDSALTEDHASH hash values. For added security, default iterations and salt sizes can be increased using the login/password_hash_algorithm parameter.

Once this is performed, the profile parameter login/password_downwards_compatibility should be set to 0 to ensure only the strongest possible hash values are generated. CUA systems can be excluded from this requirement if they are connected to systems that do not support PWDSALTEDHASH.

The report CLEANUP_PASSWORD_HASH_VALUES should then be run to discover and remove redundant password hashes. There is a clear security risk if this is not performed. Attackers may be able to use passwords encoded in BCODE and PASSCODE hashes if users employ identical or similar passwords encoded in PWDSALTEDHASH.

Enforcing single sign-on (SSO) for all dialog users provides the optimal level of protection against password attacks by removing the need to store hashes altogether. However, once SSO is enabled, direct logons should be blocked through the parameter snc/accept_insecure_gui=U and by ensuring users are not exempted from SSO through settings in user records maintained in the SNC tab of SU01.

Taken together, these countermeasures should safeguard systems from dangerous password attacks aided by well-known and easily accessible tools that can be leveraged to take full control of SAP systems.

Update: A new version of Hashcat capable of cracking SAP code version H password hashes encoded using SHA-1 is currently in beta testing. You can learn more at http://hashcat.net/forum/thread-3804.html

Organisations are not effectively addressing IT security and compliance risks according to accounting professionals

admin on August 27, 2013

The results of the 2013 Top Technology Initiatives Survey revealed that securing IT environments against cyber attack and managing IT risks and compliance are rated as two of the three greatest challenges in technology by accounting professionals in North America. The survey was performed jointly by the AICPA and CPA, the largest accounting organisations in the United States and Canada. The survey sampled approximately 2000 members from the public accounting, business and industry, consulting, government and not-for-profit sectors. Members of both the AICPA and CPA placed securing the IT environment as the second highest priority for organisations in the area of information technology. Managing IT risks and compliance was ranked third by AICPA members and fourth by CPA members.

U.S respondents expressed average confidence levels of just 51 percent in organisational initiatives designed to manage IT security and 47 percent in initiatives addressed at managing IT and compliance risks. Confidence levels have fallen drastically in 2013 due to the wave of recent well-publicized data breaches. In 2012, U.S confidence levels for securing IT environments and managing IT risk and compliance were 62 and 65 percent. However, according to the Chair of the AICPA’s Information Management and Technology Assurance (IMTA) Division, The decline in confidence levels may mean professionals are making more knowledgeable assessments of the ability of organizations to achieve technology goals. This more realistic assessment indicates that the goals may be more challenging than originally thought, and that organizations must have the focus, commitment and drive to achieve them.

Layer Seven Security assist organisations worldwide to identify and remove vulnerabilities that expose SAP systems to cyber attack and impact the ability to comply with the requirements of IT control frameworks. To learn how we can assist your organisation manage SAP risks and stay compliant, contact Layer Seven Security.

A Dangerous Flaw in the SAP User Information System (SUIM)

admin on August 13, 2013

Customers that have yet to implement Security Note 1844202 released by SAP on June 10 should do so immediately. The Note deals with a vulnerability that could be exploited to bypass monitoring controls designed to detect users with privileged access, including the SAP_ALL profile. This profile can be used to provide users with almost all authorizations in SAP systems. The vulnerability arises from a flaw in the coding of the RSUSR002 report accessible through the SAP User Information System (SUIM) or transaction SA38. RSUSR002 is a standard built-in tool used by security administrators and auditors to analyse user authorizations. A side-effect of Note 694250 was the insertion of the following line into the algorithm for RSUSR002:

DELETE userlist WHERE bname = “”

As a result of the insertion, users assigned the name “” are excluded from the search results generated by RSUSR002. This could lead to a scenario in which users are assigned SAP_ALL or equivalent authorizations without detection through regular monitoring protocols. However, the user “” would remain visible in UST04 and other user tables. The implementation of Note 1844202 will close the vulnerability in RSUSR002. Customers can also prevent the assignment of the username “” using customizing lists. For detailed instructions, refer to Note 1731549.

The Final Frontier: The Challenges in Developing Secure Custom ABAP Programs

admin on January 18, 2013

In November, SAP released an unusually high number of Security Notes to patch various forms of injection vulnerabilities in it’s software. The trend continued in December with the release of several patches for code injection flaws in the Computer Center Management System (BC-CCM), Project System (PS-IS),  Transport Organizer (BC-CTS-ORG) and work processes in Application Servers responsible for executing ABAP programs (BC-CST). Given this alarming trend, this article is focused on discussing the challenges of developing secure ABAP programs for SAP systems, free of common vulnerabilities including not only injection flaws, but cross-site scripting errors, buffer overflows, directory traversals and backdoors and rootkits.

There are three attack surfaces in SAP systems. The first is through improperly defined and controlled application-level access. This attack surface is the most commonly known and understood by SAP customers. Today, most SAP clients deploy any one of a variety of access management tools to control access to sensitive functions and maintain a strict segregation of duties in their ERP systems. This manages the risk of unauthorized access through inadequate authorization structures that grant excessive or conflicting privileges to users and administrators.

The second attack surface lies at the platform level. This generally refers to components of the NetWeaver Application Server, also referred to as the Basis area of SAP systems. The NetWeaver AS is the technical foundation of the entire SAP software stack. It provides the runtime environment for SAP applications and includes work processes for ABAP and Java programs, gateways and modules for managing RFC, Web-based and other forms of communication protocols, tools to manage user roles, profiles and authorizations, and utilities that control certain database and operating system functions. The secure configuration and management of the NetWeaver AS is a vital component of a comprehensive SAP security strategy. However, the results of our security assessments repeatedly reveal common vulnerabilities in basis settings in most SAP environments. This provides a lush attack surface to internal and external attackers looking for an avenue to manipulate or appropriate business data or deliberately disrupt the availability of SAP systems.

The third and final attack surface in SAP provides an even greater array of opportunities for attackers. This surface exists at the program level. ERP systems such as SAP are designed to perform thousands of distinct functions ranging from, for example, adding a vendor to a list of approved suppliers, performing a transport to implement a change in a specific system, or encrypting/ decrypting traffic between servers or clients. These functions are performed by programs stored in the database table known as REPOSRC that are called when requested by work processes in the NetWeaver AS.

SAP programs are developed using two distinct programming languages: Advanced Business Application Programming (ABAP) and Java.  Both are vulnerable to coding errors that could expose SAP programs to exploits such as code, OS and SQL injection, cross-site scripting, cross-site request forgery, buffer overflow, directory traversal and denial of service. SAP programs are also susceptible to missing or broken authority-checks that could lead to unauthorized execution of programs. Finally, SAP programs can contain backdoors through hardcoded credentials that bypass regular authentication and authorization controls, as well as malware known as rootkits that provide attackers with remote, privileged access to system functions and resources.

SAP performs a rigorous code review for all standard or delivered programs prior to release. However, some of the vulnerabilities present in the code base are not detected and patched until after release. Security Notes are therefore an important mechanism used by SAP to patch vulnerabilities arising from programming errors.

Custom programs are rarely subject to the same level of scrutiny applied by SAP to standard programs. Programs developed by in-house or off-shore developers to meet the needs of customers not met by standard SAP functionality are often laden with vulnerabilities that, when exploited, undermine the integrity of entire SAP landscapes. Such landscapes are only as strong as their weakest point. A robust application layer fortified with GRC tools has led attackers to shift their focus to the platform and code level. Given the relative openness of most SAP systems at the technical level, the strategy is proving to be profitable.

SAP has responded by issuing a series of recommendations to customers to strengthen configuration settings in components of the NetWeaver AS. These can be found in the whitepaper Secure Configuration of the SAP NetWeaver Application Server Using ABAP.

However, understandably SAP is less vocal on development procedures for custom programs since this is generally the responsibility of each SAP customer. The challenge should not be underestimated. Although manual code reviews to detect common vulnerabilities are theoretically possible, the skill-set to effectively review custom code is not only rare but expensive. Furthermore, it often leads to an increase in development time. Customers should consider investing in code scanning tools that are tuned to detect suspicious statements in ABAP code and integrate directly into the SAP Transport Management System (TMS). Such tools should also be capable of auto-correcting ABAP statements to minimize resource requirements and the impact on existing development times. Presently, the only tool capable of detecting and auto-correcting vulnerabilities in custom ABAP programs, with direct integration with SAP TMS, is Virtual Forge CodeProfiler. To arrange a security scan of custom programs in your SAP environment using CodeProfiler, please contact a representative at Layer Seven Security.

Cybersecurity Disclosures: A Three Step Strategy for Compliance with the New SEC Guidance

admin on August 23, 2012

Against a background of growing investor concern and pressure from legislators, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is leading the drive for more open and timely disclosure of cybersecurity risks and incidents from public companies. Earlier this year, it challenged Amazon’s decision not to disclose the financial impact of the theft of customer data held by its subsidiary Zappos in the company’s annual report. In the view of the SEC, Amazon failed to comply with rules incorporated in the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 which require “disclosure of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information about risks and events that a reasonable investor would consider important to an investment decision” (SEC). These rules were clarified by the SEC in guidance on disclosure obligations related to cybersecurity risks and incidents, issued in October last year.

The guidance is based on a broad definition of cybersecurity which is seen as a body of technologies, processes and practices designed to protect networks, systems, computers, programs and data from attack, damage or unauthorized access. It includes attacks and breaches caused by both insiders and third parties. Therefore, incidents such as the theft of proprietary software by an employee at Goldman Sachs in 2009 would fall into scope of the disclosure requirements.

According to the guidance, incidents include not just deliberate attacks, but breaches and losses resulting from unintentional events. In addition to attacks designed to misappropriate financial assets and intellectual property or other sensitive information, it includes Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks targeted at disrupting operations.

The guidance requires public companies to disclose the risk of cyber incidents if these issues are among the most significant factors that make an investment in the company speculative or risky. In order to comply with this requirement, registrants are expected to evaluate the likelihood and impact of a material incident arising from a breach or failure in their information systems and infrastructure. The assessment should take into account factors such as the value of information contained in applications and systems, the degree to which the fiscal health of a company is tied to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of such information and technology in general, known vulnerabilities, prior security incidents, the financial and reputational impact arising from an incident, and the strength of preventative controls. Based on such an evaluation, a company is required to disclose material cybersecurity risks in the 10-K annual report provided to the SEC which is made available to investors and the general public. Such disclosures are often buried within the section related to risk factors in the 10-K. However, registrants are obliged to discuss material risks within the Managements Discussion and Analysis (MD&A), an area more widely read by investors. The SEC provides some leeway on the extent of information registrants should disclose, recognizing that too much disclosure could be exploited by malicious groups and compromise security efforts.

An inventory of mission-critical or information-rich systems within most publically-listed organisations often reveals a suite of SAP applications supporting everything from sales and distribution, purchasing, financial reporting and human resource management, as well as more industry-specific areas. Invariably, these applications are powered by the SAP NetWeaver Application Server (AS), a platform used to develop programs, manage database, operating system and network connections, link together SAP and non-SAP applications, and a myriad of other administrative tasks. The NetWeaver AS is a complex, Web-enabled area of SAP that is vulnerable to a variety of internal and external attacks. These vulnerabilities are widely known and include various forms of injection, cross-site scripting, session hijacking, DoS, and other attacks. Therefore, when reviewing the strength of preventative controls in SAP systems to determine whether there exists a material cybersecurity risk that requires disclosure, companies should closely review the configuration of the NetWeaver AS. Misconfigurations in this area could create vulnerabilities that can be exploited by insiders and outsiders to embezzle assets, leak information including intellectual property, corrupt data or disrupt operations.

Securely configuring the NetWeaver AS should be the first step in a three pronged strategy aimed at managing cybersecurity risks in SAP systems. When combined with appropriate access controls and technical settings at the application level, companies running SAP applications will greatly reduce the likelihood of material risks in their SAP environments that may require disclosure.

SAP has issued a number of recommendations to help customers configure the Netweaver AS. These recommendations can be found in the whitepapers Secure Configuration of SAP NetWeaver Application Server using ABAP and Protecting SAP Applications Based on Java and ABAP Against Common Attacks. They include regular monitoring of the security configuration of the NetWeaver AS which can be met through vulnerability assessments performed by Layer Seven Security. The assessments leverage software certified by SAP and detect over 400 vulnerabilities in components of NetWeaver Application Servers, the foundation of SAP applications. To learn more, visit our services page or call 1-888-995-0993 to connect with one of our SAP security consultants.

Download the Ultimate Guide to Auditing and Securing Procure-to-Pay Controls in SAP

admin on August 17, 2012

The third installment of Layer Seven Security’s SAP Audit Guide was released today and can be downloaded at http://layersevensecurity.com/SAP_audit_guides.html. The series has proven to be a popular resource for audit and security professionals with over 10,000 downloads to date. The latest Guide focuses upon expenditure-related controls in areas such as vendor master data, purchasing, invoice processing and payment processing.

Forthcoming volumes of the Guide will deal with areas related to inventory, human resource management and Basis. Although the Guide was originally intended to the cover ERP-related modules most commonly implemented by SAP clients, Layer Seven Security will develop and issue similar guides for components such as Customer Relationship Management (CRM), Supplier Relationship Management (SRM) and the Enterprise Portal (EP). Stay tuned for future releases and feel free to give us your feedback.