Note 2357141 includes updated instructions for removing a critical OS command injection vulnerability in Report for Terminology Export. This is a component of the Basis area Terminology and Glossary (transaction STERM) used to maintain standard terminology for management reporting, financial controlling, product development, and other areas. Report for Terminology Export does not sufficiently validate user input that is used to perform operating commands through the command variable in system calls. The vulnerability could be exploited to perform arbitrary OS commands using the privileges of the underlying service. This could compromise the SAP file system.
SAP updated the priority of Notes 2531241 and 2520772 from High to Hot News based on revised CVSS scores. The Notes were originally released in September and provide corrections for patching SAP Landscape Management (LVM) to prevent the storage of sensitive information including administrative passwords in plaintext within logs that can be read in database tables. The patches released with the Notes prevent LVM from persisting passwords in plaintext but do not remove sensitive information already stored in the logs. Therefore, the solution sections includes instructions for changing passwords and discovering and removing sensitive log entries.
Note 2500044 introduces improved key management procedures through the profile variable jstartup/secure_key in order to prevent attackers from accessing private keys used for instance communication in the J2EE.
Note 2026174 deals with a high risk code injection vulnerability in a component of the Apache Struts framework used by SAP BusinessObjects Enterprise.
Finally, Note 2542426 provides recommendations for removing a privilege escalation vulnerability in the Image Imports component of SAP Assortment Planning.
Does Solution Manager have a complex installation process? Is it difficult to maintain? Does it create dangerous connections with SAP systems? Is it a high value target for attackers? Does it provide no support for zero-day vulnerabilities?
This article tackles the five most common myths about SAP Solution Manager and reveals the truth behind the fiction.
The first and most common myth is that SAP Solution Manager is complex to install and difficult to maintain. In fact, the installation procedures for Solution Manager are relatively simple and standardized, especially in comparison to other SAP platforms such as ECC. Once installed, guided procedures in Solution Manager track the progress of the setup process across three major areas: System Preparation, Basic Configuration, and Managed System Configuration. Performing the configuration steps in Technical or Application Monitoring is recommended to enable the monitoring capabilities of Solution Manager.
Once configured, security-relevant applications such as System Recommendations, Dashboards, Interface Monitoring and the Monitoring and Alerting Infrastructure are enabled and ready to use. Therefore, the standard setup procedures automatically activate most of the requirements for security monitoring using Solution Manager. Since security applications use existing connections with SAP systems, there is no need to install and configure additional agents in target systems.
Maintenance is relatively straightforward. Support packs for functional enhancements and bug fixes are released at regular intervals and are applied using the Maintenance Optimizer. The guided procedures for SOLMAN_SETUP will flag any configuration issues that need to be tackled after an SP upgrade.
The second myth is that SAP Solution Manager creates dangerous RFC connections with managed systems. The RFC connections created by Solution Manager are no more or less dangerous than similar connections between other systems in SAP landscapes. Also, the risk is not removed if you decide not to perform security monitoring using SAP Solution Manager since the connections will remain in place.
The third myth is that SAP Solution Manager is a high-value target for attackers. In fact, all SAP systems are valuable targets for attackers. Since Solution Manager does not typically store or process sensitive business data, it may be a less valuable target than systems such as ECC, CRM and SRM. Also, Solution Manager performs self-monitoring to detect security vulnerabilities including misconfigurations and missing patches, and potential security breaches captured in SAP logs. In dual landscapes, Solution Manager systems can monitor each other.
Fourthly, it’s often emphasized that Solution Manager is not certified by SAP. SAP certifies third party solutions developed by independent software vendors for integration with platforms including SAP NetWeaver. SAP does not certify it’s own software platforms such as Solution Manager. However, Solution Manager is ITIL-certified by organizations such as SERVIEW for Information Security Management.
The final myth is that Solution Manager does not provide any coverage for zero-day vulnerabilities that are unpatched by SAP. Security researchers choose to deliver virtual patches for zero-day vulnerabilities through third party tools in order to induce SAP customers to subscribe to expensive licenses for such tools. This is a business decision and not due to any technical limitation in Solution Manager. Also, all zero-day vulnerabilities do not pose a critical risk to SAP systems. The fact that patches for vulnerabilities are often released many months after the weaknesses are disclosed by security researchers to SAP does not necessarily mean that SAP systems are at serious risk. SAP’s response to such disclosures depends on an assessment of the risk posed by reported vulnerabilities. This includes factors such as the complexity and range of related exploits and the impact to data confidentiality, integrity and availability.
Firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and antivirus solutions may not protect SAP systems against advanced cyberattacks. However, this does not necessarily mean that SAP customers have to license third-party vulnerability scanning or threat detection solutions to deal with the risk. The answer to their security questions may be closer than they realize. Bundled with standard and enterprise SAP support agreements, SAP Solution Manager 7.2 includes five integrated applications to safeguard SAP systems against cyber threats:
Service Level Reporting (SLR)
Dashboard Builder
System Recommendations
Interface and Connection Monitoring (ICMon)
and the Monitoring and Alerting Infrastructure (MAI)
SAP issued an important update for Hot News Note 2371726 originally released in November 2016. The note addresses a code injection vulnerability in Text Conversion which enables SAP standard text to be replaced by industry specific text. Function module BRAN_DIR_CREATE in Text Conversion enables an authenticated development user to inject operating system commands and execute these from the SAP system via that function. Developer rights through the S_DEVELOP authorization object are required for the successful execution of the exploit. Nonetheless, the note carries a CVSS score of 9.10/ 10 and rates high in terms of impact to data confidentiality, integrity and availability. The note includes corrections for SAP Basis versions 700 – 751 which restrict the range of supported special characters and the directory created by function module BRAN_DIR_ CREATE.
Note 2486657 patches a high-risk directory traversal vulnerability in the API Engine of AS Java which arises from insufficient path validation performed by the Servlet API for resource requests. This could lead attackers to read the content of arbitrary files on servers and expose sensitive data to corruption or deletion. The Note includes instructions for updating versions 7.10 – 7.50 of AS Java to the latest patch level including the vulnerable components ENGINEAPI, J2EE ENGINE, J2EE ENGINE CORE and JEECOR.
Note 2476937 delivers a patch for a critical denial of service vulnerability in the SAP Standalone Enqueue Server which is used to support direct TCP connections between clients and servers that bypass dispatchers and message servers. Attackers can trigger resource exhaustion in the Server using specific requests. The Note includes kernel patches for SAP Kernel versions 7.21 – 7.53.
Note 2408073 includes updated instructions for manual activities required to prepare SAP systems to process digitally signed Notes. The note also includes sample files to test the security features once they are enabled.
Note 2408073 prepares systems to handle digitally signed SAP Notes. Digitally signed Notes will be issued by SAP in the future to protect against the risk of uploading Notes containing malware. Digital signatures will support authentication and the identification of changes performed by attackers to SAP-delivered Notes. SAP recommends only uploading digital signed Notes once they are available.
Note 2518518 should be implemented before Note 2408073 to install new objects required to support Notes with digital signatures. The Notes will update the Note Assistant tool to verify digital signatures using the SAPCAR utility. SAPCAR must version 7.20, patch level 2 or higher. The Note Assistant tool will process ZIP files containing Notes downloaded from the SAP Support Portal and log the results of digital signature checks. Notes that fail the digital signature check will be logged in the Application Log (transaction SLG1) and read by the Notes Assistant using the authorization object S_APPL_LOG. For further information, refer to 2537133 – FAQ – Digitally Signed SAP Notes and the Digital Signature User Guide referenced in Note 2408073.
Note 2520064 provides detailed instructions for removing a missing authentication check in the SAP Point-of-Sale (POS) Retail Xpress Server that was originally reported in July. The vulnerability could be exploited by attackers to modify files, capture sensitive information and perform a denial of service.
Notes 2531241 and 2520772 provide corrections for patching SAP Landscape Management (LVM) to prevent the storage of sensitive information including administrative passwords in plaintext within logs that can be read in database tables. The patches released with the Notes prevent LVM from persisting passwords in plaintext but do not remove sensitive information already stored in the logs. Therefore, the solution section includes instructions for changing passwords and discovering and removing sensitive log entries.
Finally, Note 2278931 removes a high-risk code injection vulnerability in Document Management Services. The vulnerability could be exploited by attackers to create backdoors or escalate privileges.
There has never been a greater need to monitor access to sensitive data in SAP systems. SAP data is increasingly accessible from access points outside network perimeters. Data in SAP systems is also targeted by attackers for cybercrime and corporate espionage. This article demonstrates how you can use SAP Solution Manager to detect and contain potential information leaks in your SAP systems before they lead to a full-blown data breach. The demonstration leverages the advanced diagnostics capabilities of the Monitoring and Alerting Infrastructure (MAI) in Solution Manager. MAI connects directly to SAP systems to monitor event data in SAP log files and tables.
The specific scenario that will be used to demonstrate the monitoring capabilities of MAI is access to SAP logon data in table USR02 using data browsing transactions such as SE16. However, the scenario can be adapted for other sensitive data including financial, employee and product-related information in SAP tables.
The first step is to configure a logging scenario to log access to table USR02 through SE16. This can be transported from a source system or configured directly in a target system using Read Access Logging (RAL). For the configuration option, we will define a log purpose and domain.
The next step is to create a recording to capture the data fields and values using SAP GUI. Read Access Logging also supports logging scenarios for data accessed through web browsers, web services, remote function calls, and OData services via the SAP Gateway.
Once the recording is completed, we will define the log contexts, groups and conditions in the RAL configuration.
Finally, we will maintain User Exclusion Lists for users that should be excluded from logging and activate the scenario.
The activation of the scenario will trigger logging for access to table USR02 through SE16. The log records can be read using the RAL Monitor.
Although RAL logs access to sensitive data with timestamps and usernames, it does not trigger an alert or notification for logged events. Therefore, the next step is to configure metrics, alerts and notifications using MAI in SAP Solution Manager.
Custom metrics and alerts are defined in the Template Maintenance section of System Monitoring within Solution Manager Configuration. Metrics and alerts can be at the database, host, system or instance level and are contained in monitoring templates. For custom metrics, we need to specify a metric name, data type and unit of measure. We also have to specify options for data collection including collector types and intervals. For the RAL scenario, we will use the RFC option for a table connector with a collection interval of 5 minutes. We will also specify the RAL table and configuration ID in the metric input parameters. Based on the configuration, MAI will connect to the RAL table in each system every 5 minutes and search for the configuration ID of the logging scenario.
For the alert, we will define a custom name and description, select the category and severity, and maintain the notification settings to automatically generate an email and/ or SMS for the alert. We will also maintain recipient lists for the notifications. To avoid alert flooding, we can adjust the interval for follow-up notifications based on number of minutes, hours or days. We can also group multiple alerts into a single notification. To activate the alert, we need to assign the metric to the alert and then assign the template containing the alert to the target systems in the landscape.
Below is the alert and email notification generated by Solution Manager for the RAL event. The alert details include the username and source IP address of the user that accessed table USR02 using transaction SE16. This is displayed in the Text Value.
The third step is the configuration of a guided procedure to support the investigation of the alert. This can be performed using the Guided Procedure Authoring Tool in Solution Manager. In the example below, we have created a 2-step guided procedure to firstly, access the RAL Monitor in order to review the event and secondly, investigate other actions performed by the user logged in the Security Audit Log. The Guided Procedure includes automatic transaction jumps to the required screens and reports in the target system.
Log settings, monitoring templates and guided procedures can be licensed and transported directly into managed systems and SAP Solution Manager to accelerate the implementation of threat detection using MAI. Contact Layer Seven Security to learn more.
On September 15, Equifax released a statement to confirm the initial attack vector that led to the compromise of personal information relating to 143 million consumers in the US, UK and Canada targeted an Apache Struts vulnerability within a web application that supports the organization’s online dispute portal. The patch for the vulnerability had been available since March but had not been applied by Equifax at the time the breach was detected on July 29. The patch was subsequently applied by Equifax but it was too late – the damage had been done.
Predictably, Equifax’s patching procedures have been cast into doubt with many questioning why the organization took four months to patch an external-facing web application that accessed large-volumes of sensitive information. The doubts were evidently shared by the Board of Directors at Equifax: both the Chief Information Officer and the Chief Security Officer were forced out last week.
Fortunately, few SAP applications are impacted by the Apache Struts vulnerability addressed by CVE-2017-5638. Although many SAP products including Banking, BusinessObjects, and Sybase use the Apache framework, very few products use the Struts library within the framework.
However, SAP customers are strongly advised to review and revise their patching efforts in light of the breach. Despite concerns related to zero-day vulnerabilities, the root cause of the vast majority of breaches remains poor security practices rather than zero-day attacks. This includes ineffective patching procedures that open a wide window of opportunity for attackers to exploit known vulnerabilities before they are patched by organizations. This point was emphasized by a statement from Fortinet with the recent release of the company’s Global Threat Landscape Report. According to Fortinet, “Cybercriminals aren’t breaking into systems using new zero day attacks, they are primarily exploiting already discovered vulnerabilities”.
SAP customers can discover and apply security patches for SAP products using System Recommendations (SysRec). SysRec is an application within SAP Solution Manager that connects directly to SAP Support for real-time patch updates. It also connects directly to each system within SAP landscapes to monitor patch levels. SysRec downloads corrections for security vulnerabilities from SAP Support to each system. It also integrates with other areas in Solution Manager including Usage Logging and Solution Documentation for change impact analysis, Change Request Management (ChaRM) for managing changes, and Test Management for testing and deployment.
Note 2381071 patches a critical cross-site Ajax vulnerability in the Prototype JS library of BusinessObjects. Ajax is a method often used by JavaScripts to exchange data between servers and clients to update parts of web pages without refreshing or reloading entire pages. This minimizes network bandwidth usage and also improves response times through rapid operations. Ajax is an acronym for Asynchronous JavaScript and XML since it’s applied via XmlHttpRequest objects that interact dynamically with servers using JavaScript. XMLHttpRequest objects call server-side objects like pages and web services.
Browsers commonly apply a same-origin policy that prevent pages from accessing external resources that have a different scheme, hostname or port than existing pages. However, same-origin policies can be bypassed using procedures such as cross-origin resource sharing. This could be exploited to transmit or load sensitive data to/ from malicious servers. The cross-site Ajax request vulnerability addressed by Note 2381071 applies to versions 4.0 – 4.2 of BusinessObjects. Corrections are included in the patch levels for each relevant support package.
Note 2486657 deals with a high-risk directory traversal vulnerability in the NetWeaver AS Java Web Container. The Web Container is a component of the J2EE Engine and provides the runtime environment for Java applications including servlets and BSPs.
It receives HTTP requests from clients via the AS Java dispatcher. The requests are processed by applications in the Web Container to access business objects in the EJB Container. Note 2486657 improves input validation for file paths to prevent applications using the Servlet API exposing resources in parent directories or other directories outside the application context.
Other important notes include Notes 2376081, 2423540, 2524134 and 2280932 that patch a code injection vulnerability impacting iviews in Visual Composer, a URL redirection vulnerability in the SAP NetWeaver Logon Application, and a missing authorization check in the Security Provider Service.
Interface Monitoring provides the answer to one of the most vexing questions in SAP security: where are our vulnerable cross-system connections and how do we monitor them to ensure they’re not abused by attackers?
Although Interface Monitoring, also known as Interface Channel Monitoring or ICMon, has been available in SAP Solution Manager since version 7.10 SP05, the application has been completely overhauled in version 7.2, especially in SP05, which has been in general availability since June.
ICMon in SolMan 7.2 includes an SAPUI5 graphical display that automatically maps the entire landscape topology in a single screen (see below). Topologies are generated by ICMon based on so-called monitoring scenarios configured in Integration Monitoring within SolMan configuration.
During scenario creation, you specify the systems and channels to monitor in each scenario. Multiple scenarios can be created to monitor different channels, systems, environments or other variables. Scenarios can also be landscape-wide to include all available systems and even cross-landscape to monitor systems located in different SAP landscapes.
Unlike some third party security tools that focus exclusively on RFC communications, ICMon can support monitoring for any SAP-supported protocol. This includes not only RFC, but HTTP, HTTPS, IDoc and Web Services.
Once the scenarios are configured, you can select from the list of available scenarios from Scope Selection in ICMon to monitor the scenario.
ICMon’s ability to automatically generate a graphical topology of cross-system connections enables users to discover vulnerable interfaces between systems including trust RFC relationships between systems in different environments. Trust relationships and stored credentials in RFC destinations could be exploited by attackers to, for example, pivot from vulnerable development or test systems to productive systems.
However, ICMon doesn’t just generate a static topology of system interfaces. It also continuously collects metrics and usage data for each channel to monitor availability, configuration and performance errors. Errors and warnings are displayed in both the ICMon dashboard (see below) and the topology. Connections with errors or warnings are displayed in red in the topology. Successful connections are displayed in green.
Usage data includes destinations and function modules called through each RFC channel with timestamps.
Alerts configured for metrics and thresholds including security-related scenarios can be viewed in the Alert Ticker from the ICMon home screen. The alerts can also be viewed in the Alert Inbox of SAP Solution Manager. In common with alerts for other application areas, ICMon uses the Monitoring and Alerting Infrastructure (MAI). Therefore, the Guided Procedure Framework can be used to apply standard operating procedures and best practices for incident management and alert handing.
Note 2442993 deals with a high-risk vulnerability in the Host Agent for SAP HANA. The Host Agent is automatically installed with every SAP instance on NetWeaver 7.02 and higher. The stand-alone component is used for controlling and monitoring SAP and non-SAP instances, databases and operating systems. Note 2442993 recommends upgrading to version 7.21 PL25 to remove a vulnerability in earlier versions that could be exploited by attackers to shutdown the Host Agent through malicious SOAP requests used for cross-platform communication via transport protocols such as HTTP and XML. A shutdown of the Host Agent could interrupt the availability of SAP services and explains the high CVSS score of 7.5/10 within the Note. Detailed instructions for upgrading the Host Agent are available in Note 1031096. The command ./saphostexec -upgrade should be performed after steps 1-4 outlined in the installation section of the Note.
Note 2476601 has an even higher CVSS score of 8.1/10. The note removes missing authentication checks in the SAP Point-of-Sale (POS) Xpress Server. The POS Xpress Server integrates components within the SAP POS suite including applications, clients and databases. Xpress Servers with Internet connectivity are particularly vulnerable to exploits targeting the missing authentication checks patched by the Note.
Note 2478377 recommends upgrading Sybase products impacted by Sweet32 attacks that target design weaknesses in some 64-bit block ciphers such as Triple-DES and Blowfish commonly used by the Internet protocols TLS, SSH and IPSec. The Sweet32 attack was discovered by researchers from the French National Research Institute for Computer Science (INRIA) in 2016 and can be used to recover HTTP session cookies in some specific scenarios.
Notes 2100926, 2184221 and 2185122 introduce switchable authorization checks for certain RFC enabled function modules in Business Warehouse, Public Services, and Master Data Governance. Switchable authorization checks supplement checks for the S_RFC authorization object and should be activated using transaction SACF.
